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Summary
Disorders of consciousness represent a major challenge in clinical practice. 
The last decade of neuroscience research brought new insights about brain 
function and neural correlates of these pathological states of consciousness. 
Although behavioural evaluation still remains the gold standard, conscious 
behaviours are too often missed, leading to unwanted grey zones between 
conscious and unconscious patients. In order to increase the chances of de-
tecting the signs of consciousness, scientists now focus on the development 
and validation of neuroimaging and electrophysiological paradigms in non-
communicative patients. Recent insights in this field also raise new questions 
of medical ethics. Indeed, for conscious patients, legal questions will occur 
about treatment plans, rehabilitation and communication strategies while 
for the unconscious patients, end-of-life decisions will take place after the 
 patients’ condition is stated as “permanent” or “irreversible”.
Key words: coma; vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome; minimally 
conscious state; neuroimaging; treatment; ethical issues
Coma and related disorders
For a long time, the primary seat of consciousness was be-
lieved to be localised only in the cerebral cortex [1]. It was 
only very recently that scientists were confronted with a 
great discovery. In 1949 neuroscientists found, through 
 animal intracranial electrophysiological experiments, that 
the activation of the brain stem reticular formation was 
 associated with the level of arousal [2]. However, like other 
revolutionary discoveries, the idea was then abandoned 
some years later following many controversies. Fortunately, 
due to our recent advancements in consciousness research, 
these subcortical correlates of consciousness were brought 
back. In fact, we do not argue anymore that a preserved 
 reticular formation system is essential for normal vigilance, 
while the intralaminar nuclei of the thalami are implicated 
in higher order brain processes since the thalamus is the first 
centre for the integration and filtering of sensory inputs [3, 
4]. These subcortical structures are working closely together 
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with a set on fronto-parietal regions that are shown to 
be functionally impaired in patients with disorders of con-
sciousness (DOCs) [5–7].
Following a brain insult, patients may experience differ-
ent stages/levels of altered and/or fluctuating arousal and 
awareness. Since the middle of the 20
th
 century, the inven-
tion of the mechanical ventilation made it possible for many 
 patients to “survive” their brain damage. In fact, before that 
era, extensive lesions almost always led to a fatal prognosis 
[8]. Therefore, this revolutionary invention called for a 
redeﬁnition of death, which was previously only based on 
the cessation of cardiac and respiratory functions, to then 
 include death based on brain function criterion (i.e., brain 
death or irreversible coma with absence of brainstem 
reﬂexes). As discussed above, DOCs can be clinically visual-
ised on a functional con tinuum encompassing vigilance 
(i.e., the level of arousal) and awareness (i.e., the level of 
conscious perception) [9, 10]. Awareness can in turn be 
 subdivided in external (e.g., stimulus-dependent thoughts, 
sensation and perception of external environmental sti-
muli) and internal awareness (e.g., stimulus-independent 
thoughts; inner speech, mental imagery, daydreaming and 
mind wandering) [11]. 
If the patients survive their brain lesions, they will first 
be plunged into a period of coma were they will be totally 
unarousable and unconscious. This period is transient and 
after some days or weeks, the patients may evolve to brain 
death or show a more favourable outcome. When the 
Abréviations
DOCs Disorders of consciousness
VS Vegetative state
UWS Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome
MCS Minimally conscious state
LIS Locked-in syndrome
CRS-R Coma recovery scale-revised
FDG-PET
18
F-fluorodeoxyglucose-positron emission 
tomography
fMRI Functional magnetic resonance imaging
DMN Default-mode network
EEG Electroencephalogram
TMS Transcranial magnetic stimulation
BCI Brain-computer interface
DBS Deep brain stimulation
NCS-R Nociception Coma Scale-Revised
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 patients show arousal signs objectified by sustained eye 
opening with the presence of reflex behaviours only, we 
will diagnose them as being in an unresponsive wakefulness 
syndrome (UWS) [12], formerly known as the vegetative state 
(VS) [13, 14]. This new terminology is thought to be more 
descriptive of the actual state of these patients thus pre vent-
ing the use of a pejorative term. According to the  MultiSociety 
Task Force on PVS, the UWS/VS is considered  irreversible 
12 months after a traumatic etiology and 3 months after an 
anoxic aetiology. After that temporal window, the chances 
to recover signs of consciousness are close to zero [15]. 
The perplexity that arises from the seeing of such a paradox-
ical condition – a person completely aroused but totally 
 unaware – yields to a lot of ethical debates and raises impor-
tant questions about life sustaining and end-of-life decisions. 
One of the first clinical indications of the recovery of 
awareness is the presence of visual pursuit objectified by 
the use of moving stimuli in front of the patients’ eyes [16]. 
The minimally conscious state (MCS) is characterised by the 
presence of inconsistent but reliable signs of consciousness 
[16]. This state has recently been subdivided into two in-
dependent subcategories based on clinical behaviours and 
 neuroimaging data; that is, when the patient shows response 
to command, he will receive the diagnosis of MCS plus (+), 
and when there is only the presence of non-reflexive signs 
of consciousness that are not related to language processing 
(e.g., visual pursuit or localisation to pain), the patient 
will be diagnosed as MCS minus (–) [17]. Compared to the 
MCS+ patients, MCS– patients may suffer from a significant 
general decrease in brain metabolism in the left hemisphere 
and particularly in regions that are functionally linked to 
speech comprehension and production, in motor and pre-
motor areas and in sensory-motor areas [18]. Differential 
dia gnosis for MCS patients would therefore be mainly due to 
the functional recovery (or not) of speech-processing areas 
[19]. It should be noted that there is another form of MCS 
condition called “akinetic mutism” [20]. Akinetic mutism 
patients will show significant decrease in the initiation of 
 behaviour and speech mainly due to lesions in mesio-frontal 
areas [21, 22]. As for the UWS/VS condition, MCS may be a 
chronic or transient condition. However, unlike the UWS/
VS patients, the chances of functional recovery for MCS 
 patients are higher [23]. In addition, patients who  rapidly 
evolve into a MCS tend to show a higher frequency of func-
tional recovery [24].
Patients may emerge from a MCS showing functional 
communication and use of objects. Although they might 
 recover a normal level of consciousness, their cognitive abil-
ities (e.g., speech and attention capacities) may be impaired 
due to the primary insult [16]. Thus, the differentiation 
of this entity still remains controversial since patients’ signif-
icant cognitive impairments make it difficult to reliably and 
consistently demonstrate these functional behaviours [25]. 
Finally, locked-in syndrome (LIS) or pseudocoma patients are 
 often misdiagnosed as being unconscious. After a period of 
coma, they will regain normal arousal and awareness levels 
but will remain paralysed and voiceless due to a ventral 
 pontine lesion producing supranuclear motor de-efferenta-
tion preventing any voluntary movements of all four 
limbs and the last cranial nerves without interfering with 
consciousness [26]. At the bedside, LIS patients therefore 
superﬁcially resemble to patients in an UWS/VS or an aki-
netic mutism [7, 27, 28]. The anatomy of the responsible 
 lesion is such that the patients are left with a primary way of 
communication through vertical eye movements, which are 
often spared [29].
Diagnosis
Attributing an accurate diagnosis in altered states of con-
sciousness may represent one of the biggest clinical chal-
lenges that healthcare practitioners are facing. The DOC’s 
 diagnosis is of major importance for medical, ethical and 
 legal reasons. Therefore, it is particularly important that we 
avoid “grey zones” between conscious and unconscious 
 patients. For example, care management and treatment 
plans will differ significantly for MCS and UWS/VS since the 
primer are shown to have a better recovery rate. So far, there 
have been a number of published diagnostic criteria and 
scales to assess patients’ level of consciousness. The Glasgow 
Coma Scale is still widely used although it has been criticised 
by several investigators due to lacks in sensitivity and spe-
cificity [30]. To date, the most complete and sensitive scale 
available to detect signs of consciousness is the revised 
 version of the Coma Recovery Scale (CRS-R) by Joseph Giacino 
and his collaborators [31]. This scale has been shown to 
be the best in differentiating UWS/VS from MCS patients 
[32–35]. Clinical diagnosis remains the gold standard to 
 assess DOCs patients but recent studies have shown that a 
high misdiagnosis rate is still found between clinicians [32]. 
This issue can be attributable to some reasons. First, con-
sciousness assessments mainly represent a subjective evalua-
tion and require expertise, and second, since consciousness’ 
assessments are limited to the evaluation of external aware-
ness, patients may not be able to demonstrate conscious 
 behaviours at the bedside, probably because of their motor 
deficits such as spasticity, their fluctuating level of vigilance, 
their impaired cognitive abilities and the sedative effects 
of some prescribed medication [36, 37]. Communication 
deficits, such as aphasia and apraxia, further complicate the 
expression of patients’ consciousness [38]. Besides, some 
clinical features – e.g., blinking to a visual threat – may not 
represent patients’ awareness but can complicate the attri-
bution of a correct diagnosis. Indeed, almost 50% of UWS/
VS patients can show blinking to threats in the absence of 
any other clinical signs of consciousness [39]. Furthermore, 
the way an item is assessed can also lead to diagnosis errors. 
For instance, it has been shown that visual pursuit should 
be assessed with a mirror. In fact, the use of a mirror has 
 permitted identification of visual pursuit in 25 to 30% more 
patients than the tracking of a moving person and object, 
 respectively [40]. 
Measuring and detecting consciousness
In some cases, the absence of observed, reliable and con-
scious behaviours at the bedside is not a proof of the absence 
of consciousness. To address this problem, clinicians now 
rely on other strategies to add more objectivity to their 
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 clinical assessment. With the advantage of being totally 
 motor-independent and derived directly from brain signals, 
para-clinical neuroimaging and neurophysiological tools 
can increase the detection of consciousness signs that can 
be missed at the bedside [41, 42]. In fact, for some patients, 
recovery of conscious awareness may precede motor recov-
ery. With these techniques, it is now possible to (1.) measure 
the level of consciousness, (2.) detect signs of consciousness 
through the objectification of conscious information pro-
cessing and (3.) provide a means of self-expression for 
 non-communicative patients. Neuroimaging assessment 
procedures can also permit detection of the presence of 
aphasia taking into account the existence of receptive 
and/or expressive language deﬁcits [38]. Finally, the use of 
these “high tech” tools will allow the gathering of insights 
about patients’ recovery and prognosis [43–45]. 
Measuring consciousness
Brain activity can be explored at rest in the absence of any 
external stimulation. The main advantages of measuring 
brain functioning at rest are that (1.) it does not require any 
participation from the patients (e.g., language comprehen-
sion and/or production or motor responses) and (2.) it does 
not require sophisticated experimental setup. 
18
F-fluoro-
deoxyglucose-positron emission tomography (FDG-PET) 
 imaging studies have shown that the recovery of global 
 metabolic activity might not be required for regaining con-
sciousness in DOCs patients. These studies have identified 
a fronto-parietal network encompassing midline (i.e., ante-
rior cingulate/mesiofrontal and posterior cingulate/pre-
cuneus) and lateral (i.e., prefrontal and posterior parietal) 
associative cortices that is consistently hypometabolic in 
 unresponsive patients and regains metabolic activity when 
the patient recovers signs of awareness [6, 46, 47]. More-
over, data obtained in sleep (for a review e.g., see [48]) and 
general anaesthesia (for a review e.g., see [49]) also corrob-
orates these findings. A practical example of the FDG-PET 
imaging studies is the identification of a comparable impair-
ment in the fronto-parietal network in anoxic chronic pa-
tients with or without clinical fixation, suggesting that this 
item would not reflect a sign of consciousness [50]. The use 
of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) paradigms 
also permitted to highlight particular brain activation linked 
to the different states of consciousness. Resting state con-
nectivity studies have demonstrated that a resting brain is 
characterised by coherent fluctuations in the blood-oxygen-
level-dependent (BOLD) signal. The midline fronto-parietal 
or default-mode network (DMN), comprising cortical regions 
that are known to be more active during rest (encompassing 
precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex, mesiofrontal/anterior 
cingulate cortex, and temporoparietal junction  areas), has 
been shown to be informative of cognitive function [51, 52] 
and to be correlated with bedside behavioural assessment 
[53]. Furthermore, DMN activity was found to be com-
pletely absent in a brain-dead patient (fig. 1) [54]. 
Figure illustrating the default-mode network encompassing the posterior parietal cortex (PCC) and the midline frontal cortex (MFC).
A  The default-mode network’s functional connectivity seems to be correlated with the patients’ consciousness level as assessed  
by the Coma recovery scale-revised. (Modified from: Vanhaudenhuyse A, Noirhomme Q, Tshibanda LJF, Bruno MA, Boveroux P, 
Schnakers C, et al. Default network connectivity reflects the level of consciousness in non-communicative braindamaged patients. 
Brain. 2010;133:161–71.)
B  Absence of functional connectivity in the network in a brain-dead patient (modified form [54]).
Figure 1
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With this aim of developing resting automated para- 
clinical measures that could help in improving DOCs diagno-
sis, quantitative EEG is also used for the differentiation 
 between UWS/VS and MCS patients. Although most quan-
titative EEG findings can be informative, most of the data 
only provide information about the brain’s general function-
ing. To address this lack in physiological details, a resting 
EEG study using power spectra and connectivity measures, 
aimed at exploring the functional differences in conscious 
and unconscious patients. Taking into account coherence 
measures (the measure of connectivity between two elec-
trode sites), it is possible to gather useful information about 
the level of integration and connection of the brain’s net-
works [55]. Using this technique, recent work showed that, 
compared to UWS/VS, MCS patients have a better connected 
network in the theta and alpha bands and that UWS/VS 
 patients may show increased delta power but will at the 
same time show a decrease in alpha power, as compared 
to MCS patients [56]. Interestingly, quantitative EEG con-
nectivity measures are correlated with the clinical diagnosis 
obtained with repeated CRS-R assessments at the bedside 
[56, 57]. To complement these approaches, transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) together with high-density EEG is 
now employed to evaluate effective connectivity (i.e., the 
 influence one neural system exerts over another) at the 
 bedside. According to theoretical models of consciousness, 
effective connectivity represents a basic requirement for 
consciousness and means that multiple, specialised areas of 
the brain (i.e., the thalamocortical system) must engage in 
rapid causal interactions [7, 58]. TMS/EEG measures report 
that, in UWS/VS patients, a simple and local electrical 
 response is obtained after stimulating the brain, indicating a 
breakdown of effective connectivity like previously observed 
in unconscious sleeping or anaesthetised subjects [59–61]. 
In contrast, TMS/EEG in MCS patients will trigger much 
more complex activations in the brain that will involve 
 sequentially distant cortical ipsilateral and contralateral 
 areas to the site of stimulation, similar to activations re-
corded in LIS patients [59].
Detection of consciousness and communication
Specific paradigms using external stimuli are used in order 
to identify possible residual higher order cognitive processes 
in DOCs patients. First, neuroimaging passive paradigms will 
look at brain processes during the presentation of stimula-
tion without the active participation of the patient. For 
 example, with the use of FDG-PET scan and fMRI, a signifi-
cantly different cerebral processing can be identified be-
tween conscious and unconscious patients. Indeed, while 
MCS patients show a widespread cortico-cortical functional 
activity in associative areas following visual, somatosensory 
and auditory stimuli, UWS/VS patients only show isolated 
brain activity in primary sensory cortices [62–66]. Associa-
tive areas are therefore thought to be essential for an inte-
grated and more elaborated interpretation of the stimulation 
(i.e., fronto-parietal network and insula) [67, 68]. The iso-
lated and low-level brain activation seen in UWS/VS pa-
tients suggests the absence of information integration, thus 
the absence of conscious perception [7]. 
Although passive paradigms can be informative in terms 
of brain processing [69], they lack in diagnosis information 
since they were not specifically designed for detecting relia-
ble signs of conscious awareness. Active paradigms might be 
more demanding in terms of patients’ cognitive abilities 
but they can reliably gather diagnosis insights with the 
 objectification of command following through specific brain 
activations. In fact, recent functional neuroimaging studies 
based on active tasks provided evidence for awareness in 
 patients diagnosed with UWS/VS (and MCS) as they pre-
sented with volitional brain activity and thus clear signs 
of awareness as detected with fMRI [70–73], electroence-
phalography (EEG) [74–76] or electromyography (EMG) 
[77]. In an active motor imagery fMRI paradigm, 2 UWS/VS 
and 3 MCS patients were able to correctly imagine them-
selves as visiting their house and playing tennis as compared 
to healthy controls [72]. An EEG active paradigm based on 
the P3 could correctly diagnose a LIS who had previously 
been considered as being comatose [78]. EMG permitted 
to objectify preparatory motor responses to command in 
1 UWS/VS and 2 MCS non-communicative patients pre-
senting with extensive motor deficits with the electrical 
 recordings of muscle activity [77]. Finally, a recent high-
density EEG motor imagery task study permitted detec- 
tion of reliable signs of response to commands in 3 out of 
16 UWS/VS patients (fig. 2) [76]. 
In addition to the detection of signs of consciousness, 
brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), recordings of brain signals 
might also allow communication enabling self-expression 
in non-communicative patients with motor deficits [79, 80]. 
BCIs have classically been developed for LIS and other 
 pathologies involving severe motor deficits (e.g., amyo-
trophic lateral sclerosis) in order to provide a means of inter-
action with their environment. In DOCs, BCIs using active 
Figure 2  Figure showing a similar brain activation pattern in motor cortices 
during  performance of a high-density EEG motor imagery task  
in a patient who received a prior clinical diagnosis of UWS/VS.
UNRESPONSIVE
“VEGETATIVE”
PATIENT
HEALTHY
CONTROL
“MOVE YOUR FOOT” “MOVE YOUR HAND”
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paradigms are now developed to allow patients to express 
their consciousness and to communicate. For example, a 
 remarkable case of a behaviourally diagnosed UWS/VS 
 patient who could correctly answer autobiographical yes–no 
type questions (e.g., “Is your name John?”), by producing 
specific brain activations through mental imagery tasks 
(i.e., to say yes, imagine yourself playing tennis; to say no, 
imaging yourself moving around in your house) in the MRI 
with the previously reported paradigm [72]. Therefore, this 
revolutionary finding strikingly demonstrated the possibility 
of establishing binary communication using patients’ brain 
responses alone. Recently, an EEG-based BCI aimed for the 
first time to use an auditory-evoked potential task (P3-based 
paradigm) for communication purposes in a population with 
DOCs, LIS and healthy volunteers. The results showed 
that 20% of the MCS patients were able to show command 
following but without showing communication with this 
 device, 50% of the LIS patients and 81% of the healthy vol-
unteers could reliably use the communication system [81]. 
These findings highlight the challenges encountered in the 
development of BCI paradigms. Indeed, the proof of the 
presence of higher cognitive functions can be obtained with 
these active paradigms and BCIs, but the absence of brain 
 activation or low performances do not constitute a proof of 
absence of such high-level information processing. There-
fore, it is impossible to know whether DOCs patients tried 
to perform the task or not. Also, an absence of command 
 following could be explained by the fact that the proposed 
task and commands might actually require more cognitive 
resources than expected and thus be too difficult. One solu-
tion to this issue, as well as for paradigms, aimed at the 
 detection of signs of consciousness, would be to provide 
training sessions [82]. Repeated sessions are also recom-
mended to rule out the absence of significant performance 
that could result from the rapid changes in vigilance in DOCs 
populations. 
Therapeutic interventions
Recent surgical and pharmacological trials have shown 
 significant effects of specific treatments on patients’ levels of 
awareness in DOCs. For instance, deep brain stimulation 
(DBS) has been proposed as a therapeutic approach in MCS 
patients. A successful DBS case was reported in 2007 when 
a 6-year-post-injury patient recovered complex cognitively 
mediated behavioural patterns after the application of bi-
lateral thalamic electrical stimulation (Schiff et al., 2007). 
This case report showed that DBS could improve arousal 
level and fluctuations as well as promoting more complex 
behavioural responsiveness as measured with the CRS-R. 
Pharmacological trials have been focused mainly on Aman-
tadine, Zolpidem and Apomorphine in clinical trials. Aman-
tadine was initially used in the treatment of Parkinson’s 
 disease, and because of its antiviral properties, it was also 
employed against influenza. Amantadine is a dopaminergic 
agonist that has been suggested to improve recovery in 
DOCs patients. A case report of a MCS patient revealed that, 
using multiple CRS-R evaluations and FDG-PET cerebral 
metabolism measurements, motor and cognitive abilities 
showed significant improvement after 3 weeks of Amanta-
dine treatment [83]. A recent placebo-controlled trial also 
showed that patients receiving Amantadine showed a signif-
icant faster recovery after a 4-week treatment plan [84]. 
Zolpidem is an imidazopyridine which acts like an agonist on 
sub-type 1 of the inhibiting receptors of the gamma-Amin-
obutyric acid (GABA
A
). This agent is initially recommended 
in the treatment of insomnia and presents sedative, anti-
convulsive, anxiolytic and myorelaxant effects. Zolpidem is 
often described as a “miracle drug” for awakening patients 
with DOCs. However, the real proportion of Zolpidem is still 
not well documented. A placebo-controlled trial conducted 
in 2009 aimed at obtaining an estimate of the frequency of 
clinically significant responses among patients with DOC. 
The authors found 1 responder of a total of 15 DOC patients. 
Behaviourally, the patient went from an UWS/VS to a MCS 
diagnosis according to the CRS-R assessments pre- and post- 
treatment [85]. Finally, Apomorphine is a non-selective 
 dopaminergic agonist that was initially indicated to treat Par-
kinson’s disease and erectile impotence but has also showed 
to have positive effects in a few cases of severely brain-
injured patients. In a previous clinical prospective study, 
subcutaneous administration of Apomorphine was used in 
traumatic UWS/VS and MCS to improve consciousness. 
 According to the clinical assessments, the results showed 
an outcome improvement in all patients within the first 
24 hours and the positive effects were still present after 
4 weeks with 50% of the sample completely recovered 
 consciousness. Moreover, improvements in consciousness 
were sustained for at least 1 year, even after the treatment 
was discontinued [86].
Ethical issues 
DOCs raise a lot of ethical debates. First, one of the most 
 debatable issues about this population is pain perception. 
The International Association of Pain Specialists (IAPS) defines 
it as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience asso-
ciated with real or potential tissue damage” [87]. Thus pain 
is a first-person experience and classic pain assessments 
 require the verbal feedback of the patients. When it comes 
to DOCs patients, the question of pain perception is far more 
complex since they are unable to communicate their feelings 
and possible pain experiences. Detecting and treating pain 
represents important medical and ethical considerations, 
 especially in severely brain-injured patients, thus neuro-
imaging and behavioural studies can help to address the 
question. Since pain represents a conscious first person per-
ception, nociception is a more appropriate term that should 
be used regarding DOCs patients. As discussed previously in 
this review, on a neurofunctional perspective, it appears that 
MCS patients show a pain-matrix activation that is, although 
reduced, similar to what is seen in healthy volunteers while 
UWS/VS patients do not show this higher-order, widespread 
brain activation. Since the communication between associa-
tive brain areas and networks represent one key component 
of conscious awareness, it has been suggested that uncon-
scious patients would not feel pain like the MCS patients and 
healthy volunteers do. These results obviously have major 
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consequences on patients’ daily care and management. 
 Despite these findings, according to a recent European sur-
vey, still high rates of medical doctors (56%) and para-
medical professionals (68%) believe that UWS/VS do feel 
pain [88]. These attitudes may have major consequences in 
patients’ care management and especially in cases where 
UWS/VS patients are withdrawn from life-support treat-
ment. In these cases patients may be left without administra-
tion of analgesic drugs during their dying process. Moreover, 
pain could be experienced by patients without demonstrat-
ing any behavioural sign of such discomfort. As well as the 
high rate of misdiagnosis of the altered states of conscious-
ness highlighted above in this paper, nociception and pain 
could also be easily missed in this non-communicative pop-
ulation. Therefore, pain prophylaxis and treatment have 
been proposed for all patients suffering from DOCs [89, 90]. 
To date, the presence or absence of nociception was inferred 
via motor responses following noxious stimulation, such as 
stereotypical responses, ﬂexion withdrawal and localisation 
responses [89]. In DOCs patients, only a clear localisation to 
noxious stimulation is considered to be an indicator of 
 conscious perception [16]. In order to accurately non-ver-
bally assess nociception in this challenging population, a 
 behavioural scale has been proposed for the first time. The 
Nociception Coma Scale (NCS) assesses behavioural responses 
at rest, during daily nursing care and during nociceptive 
stimulation [91]. Recently, a revised version of the NCS has 
been proposed (NCS-R). The NCS-R encompasses motor, 
verbal and facial behaviours, excluding the previous visual 
subscale that was found to be uninformative of the patient’s 
level of discomfort since the behaviours included in the 
 subscale were frequently observed in response to non- 
noxious situations. According to this new version, the need 
of adequate pain management is recommended at a total 
cut-off score of 4 (on a maximum of 9) or higher [92]. 
A second significant ethical challenge concerns the per-
ceived quality of life of DOCs patients. Healthy individuals 
and medical professionals sometimes assume that their 
 quality of life might be so poor that it is not worth living. To 
address the question, a survey on quality of life has been 
proposed to be filled in by LIS patients. Although the LIS is 
not considered to be part of the DOCs, this pathological 
 condition is often misdiagnosed as being such and might 
 represent one of the cruelest physical disabilities. On 65 LIS 
patients interviewed, 47 self-reported a meaningful quality 
of life, while a minority of 17 patients rated themselves as 
being unhappy [93]. Moreover, demand for euthanasia is 
surprisingly infrequent in chronic LIS patients [94]. Indeed, 
less than 30% of the chronic LIS patients would report 
the wish to die or suicidal thoughts [94]. As healthcare prac-
tioners, these findings stress the importance of leaving our 
 personal attitudes and beliefs aside when dealing with 
 severely disabled patients. Indeed, contrary to popular creed, 
it seems that life is worth living it even in cases of severe 
 disabilities. Biased clinicians interpretations of the patients’ 
conditions might modify medical treatment plans and 
inﬂuence families in inappropriate ways. 
Conclusion
We have reviewed the recent advances regarding coma 
and related disorders. As we have previously highlighted, 
disentangling between conscious and UWS/VS patients re-
presents a major challenge that can generate severe con-
sequences. It is to these latter problematic challenges that 
the ethical and legal end-of-life issues of withholding and 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment are related [95, 96]. 
The rate of misdiagnosis among the altered states of con-
sciousness is still very high; therefore, the use of behavioural 
scales in parallel with the increasingly powerful neuroimag-
ing technologies will help to refine our understanding and 
definition of DOCs thus, leading to a more accurate diagno-
sis and prognosis. Although these technologies still need to 
be validated in a larger population of patients for finer inter-
pretation of the provided information, they have already 
 revealed themselves as promising complementary assess-
ment tools. In this sense, multi-centric studies must be 
 supported in order to address the sensitivity and speciﬁcity 
of the neuroimaging or electrophysiological tools. Collabora-
tive work also seems essential to gather comparable data for 
the clinical behavioural assessments and for the potential 
prognostic value of the para-clinical technologies [97, 98].
The rapidly growing neuroscientific findings on DOCs 
must be taken into account for patient’s future care needs 
and to promote adequate policies to keep up with the 
findings. In fact, new findings in consciousness research 
has led to the redefinition of clinical criteria for diagnosis 
and brings to the clinician new knowledge about patient’s 
recovery and prognosis [44, 45]. Because most of these 
 reported complementary para-clinical procedures remain 
mainly  investigational, clinicians must be aware of the level 
of  evidence supporting the research findings and of the 
unavoidable ethical and social issues involved. Indeed, we 
previously discussed patients who were first diagnosed as 
 being un conscious at bedside; but then correctly diagnosed 
when  assessed with neuroimaging and electrophysiological 
techniques. These cases seem to be increasing as does our 
understanding of the human brain and its consciousness’s 
correlates. As a result, clinicians must increasingly answer 
questions and requests from family members and surrogate 
decision makers about the new diagnostic and therapeutic 
procedures. Finally, the future of consciousness research, 
from a scientific and clinical point of view, should focus on 
further validation of the para-clinical techniques and para-
digms used. This would be especially advisable in the acute 
phase, when the patient’s medical condition allows it, in 
 order to tract the patient’s evolution and to provide solid 
prognosis clues for clinicians and patient’s families.
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